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Resembling Nothing: 
Image and Being in Plato 
 
Yancy Hughes Dominick, Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois 
 
A crucial application of Plato’s views on the use of images in philosophy occurs through the use of the image 
relationship as an image for the relation of forms and particulars.  The relation of a picture to the object it depicts, or 
that between a reflection and what it reflects, can be seen as analogous to the relation of a particular to the form in 
which it participates.  Although the attack on the image model as analogous to the relation of forms and particulars 
in the Parmenides threatens to undermine any reliance on that model, this essay will present a case for reliance on 
the image model.   
  
1  Image and regress 
The view of forms as models which particulars resemble seems to invite the ‘third man’ argument.  
Socrates introduces the image analogy in an attempt to defend the claim that separate forms exist and that particulars 
have the character they have “to the extent that they get a share” in such forms (Parmenides 128e-129a).  To avoid 
the first ‘third man’ regress, Socrates’ theory needs a notion of participation that does not imply a symmetrical 
relationship which renders form and particular both large, for example, in the same way.  Thus, Socrates says that  
what appears most likely to me is this:  these forms are like patterns (paradeigmata) set in nature, and other 
things resemble (eoikenai) them and are likenesses (einai homoiômata); and this partaking of the form is, 
for the other things, simply being modeled on them (eikasthênai autois) (132d1-4).1 
 
This analogy enables the forms to appear not as things in the same class as particulars, which would make the theory 
subject to the first version of the ‘third man’ regress.  An image possesses its character only because it derives that 
character from its model—the two have the character for quite different reasons, and do not appear to have the 
character in the same way:  one has it as original, the other as image.2  
 Plato’s Parmenides, however, constructs a regress argument in terms of the image analogy, apparently 
dashing Socrates’ hopes.   
“If something resembles the form,” he said, “can that form not be like what has been modeled on it, to the 
extent that the thing has been made like it?  Or is there any way for something like to be like what is not 
like it? (esti tis mêchanê to homoion mê homoiôi homoion einai?)” 
 “There is not.” 
 “And isn’t there a compelling necessity for that which is like to partake of the same one form as 
what is like it?” 
 “There is.” 
 “But if like things are like by partaking of something, won’t that be the form itself?” (132d5-e4). 
 
Parmenides’ last question involves the form itself; the result should be that “if the form proves to be like what 
partakes of it, a fresh form will never cease emerging” (133a1-3).  If a form explains the resemblance of any two or 
more things, a further form must be invoked in order to explain the resemblance of the form itself to those 
particulars.3  The form and the particular are alike, as a model is like its image.  If two things are alike because they 
participate in some one form, though, then the form and the like things must also partake of some additional form.  
This need for further forms continues into infinity, thus eliminating any chance that looking to forms might explain 
particulars. 
 
                                                
1 I shall make use of Gill and Ryan’s translation of the Parmenides, noting any changes. 
2 David Hunt, for example, notes this feature of the image relationship, at Hunt, 16. 
3 Numerous fascinating—though usually mutually exclusive—attempts to formalize this argument, along with the first ‘third 
man’ argument, have been made.  I refer readers, in particular, to Vlastos 1954, 241-244; Geach 271-275; Lee 1964, 53-55; 
Patterson, 52-53; Schofield, 59-61; and Hunt, 3-6. 
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2 Resistance 
2.1 An object does not resemble its reflection 
If particulars relate to forms not as all images relate to originals, but as reflections relate to their originals, then one 
can claim that the particulars obviously depend upon the forms despite the fact that they cannot possibly be grouped 
with those forms.  A reflection is nothing at all in itself—it is a product of the interaction of original, light, and 
reflective surface; it is, itself, nothing.  Particulars, on this model, are simply products of the interaction of the forms 
and the what Timaeus calls the receptacle (Timaeus, 52c).4  In the words of R. E. Allen, an early proponent of this 
interpretation, the “reflection does not resemble the original; rather, it is a resemblance of the original.”5  The faulty 
premise of Plato’s Parmenides’ argument, then, is the claim that the particular is some thing that resembles a form, 
rather than simply a resemblance of a form. 
 Allen uses the example of a reflection of a red scarf:6  one cannot call the reflection a scarf (it cannot, of 
course, keep one’s neck warm in the winter).  Further, Allen claims, one cannot call the reflection red either—to do 
so would be “to say that we can predicate of reflections, which are essentially adjectival, in just the way we 
predicate of their originals, things which exist in their own right.”7  The reflection of the scarf is essentially 
adjectival, it exists as a quality or characteristic of the scarf, and is nothing in its own right.  The reflection of the 
scarf is properly ‘the scarf reflected.’  Speaking of the reflection as though it were independent of the actual scarf 
involves making a mistake, taking the reflection to be what it is not, an actual thing which exists in its own right.8  
One can, of course, speak the words ‘the reflection is red’; but “you cannot mean the same thing you mean when 
you call its original red.”9  The reflection cannot resemble the scarf with respect to being red, for the reflection is 
called red in a way quite different from the way in which the scarf is called red.  One cannot say, then, that 
reflections and their originals meaningfully resemble each other.  If particulars are like reflections, one cannot say 
they resemble forms, and the ‘third man’ regress cannot occur. 
Is it reasonable to treat particulars as like reflections rather than like any sort of image?  The Timaeus offers 
the clearest evidence that reflections provide the best analogue for particulars.  In particular, the passage in the 
Timaeus that presents the receptacle suggests this reading.  The fact that images in mirrors are wholly dependent 
upon the mirror and their originals combined with the complete insubstantiality of mirror images parallels the 
description of the things that appear in the receptacle. 
 Timaeus describes the receptacle as “that in which [the elements] appear to keep coming to be and from 
which they subsequently perish” (49e7-50a1—translator’s italics).10  Cornford explains that these lines make clear 
the fact that the receptacle ought to be seen on the model of a mirror:  “The Receptacle is not that ‘out of which’ (ex 
hou) things are made; it is that ‘in which’ (en hôi) qualities appear, as fleeting images are seen in a mirror.”11  The 
language that Timaeus uses in speaking both of the receptacle and of the phenomena that appear in it suggests that 
things in the physical world are analogous to reflections in a mirror. 
The caution about speaking of each of the four ‘elements’ lends support to this reading.  Timaeus tells his 
listeners that they are safest 
to characterize it, that is, fire, not as ‘this,’ but always as ‘what is such’ . . .  And never to speak of anything else as 
‘this,’ as though it has some stability, of all the things at which we point and use the expressions ‘that’ and 
‘this’ and so think we are designating something (49d5-e2).12 
                                                
4 See Lee 1966, 362-366; Allen 1960, 50-57. 
5 Allen 1960, 50—italics original. 
6 Allen 1960, 49-50. 
7 Allen 1960, 50. 
8 Lee discusses such mistakes, arguing that once one recognizes that the reflection is a reflection, one must no longer feel capable 
of referring to the reflection as a thing in its own right—“once it is clear how the trick is done—once we know about the mirror—
we can no longer speak in these terms” (Lee 1966, 356-357). 
9 Allen 1960, 50. 
10 I shall make use of Zeyl’s translation of the Timaeus, noting any changes. 
11 Cornford 1937, 181—italics original.  See also, for example, Ross, who describes phenomena as “copies of the Forms, 
produced in space as a reflection of a body is produced in a mirror” (Ross, 125-126). 
12 Cherniss (1954) originally suggested an alternate reading, on which, significantly, the phrase mê touto alla to toiouton 
hekastote prosagoreuein pyr (49d5-6) should read “not to say ‘this is fire’ but ‘what on any occasion is such and such is fire’” 
(following the alternate translation offered at Cherniss 1954, 114).  The traditional translation, then, advises listeners that 
phenomenal fire should be called ‘what is such,’ not ‘this’; the alternate advises that what on each occasion is such (in other 
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Calling a bit of phenomenal fire ‘this’ would imply that it had some substantial being to it;13 instead, only the 
receptacle—“that in which [things] appear to keep coming to be and from which they subsequently perish, that’s the 
only thing to refer to by means of the expressions ‘that’ and ‘this’” (49e7-50a2—translator’s italics).  Timaeus 
portrays physical objects as lacking any inherent, substantial character—they cannot even be pointed to as things in 
their own right.  Such phenomena closely resemble a reflection in a mirror,14 which is actually nothing at all except 
a trick of light and surface.   
 Timaeus’ gold example furthers this notion of particulars as insubstantial.  Of gold molded into various 
shapes, the safest answer to the question ‘what is it?’ “would be to say, ‘gold,’ but never ‘triangle’ or any of the 
other shapes that come to be in the gold” (50b1-3).  Likewise with particulars, if asked ‘what is it?’ one ought to say 
it is the receptacle, nothing more.  Although the comparison of the receptacle to gold seems to suggest that 
phenomena might have more substance that reflections, the fact that one cannot say that some phenomena are 
anything but the receptacle strengthens the claim that such things, like reflections, lack any subsistent, independent 
nature.15  At the close of the section on the receptacle Timaeus again portrays the physical universe as insubstantial 
and dependent:   
Since an image does not have as its own that which it has come to signify (an image is invariably borne 
along to depict something else), it stands to reason that the image should therefore come to be in something 
else, somehow clinging to being, or else be nothing at all (52c2-5—translator’s italics). 
 
These images’ ‘clinging to being’ in the receptacle suggests the dependent status of something like a reflection.  
Unlike images such as statues or paintings, reflections cannot survive the departure of either their model or their 
medium.16  The receptacle seems to resemble a mirror.   
 If this reading of the receptacle as a mirror is correct, Plato is saved from the ‘third man’ regress.  
Reflections cannot be said to resemble their originals, because reflections are, in essence, nothing.  If particulars are 
                                                                                                                                                       
words, the characteristics shared by many instances of fire) should be called ‘fire,’ while some particular instantiation of those 
characteristics should not be so called.  Although the dispute ranges over much of 49d-e, the different treatments of the two lines 
above (49d5-6) capture the larger differences:  thus, I restrict my remarks to them.  Both translations seem well-recommended 
(see, e.g., Cherniss 1954; M. L. Gill; Lee 1964 and 1967; Sallis 1999); Lee, though, makes the intriguing point that Cornford, 
after offering the traditional translation, explicates the passage in a way more fitted to the alternate translation (which Cornford’s 
book antedates):  Cornford writes that “Plato is now asserting that ‘fire’ is properly only a name for a certain combination of 
qualities or ‘powers,’ which appear and disappear and are always varying” (Cornford 1937, 179-181; cf. Lee 1964, 117-118)—
the name ‘fire,’ then seems, as the alternate translation suggests, best applied to the qualities, rather than to some particular 
instantiation of those qualities.  
The controversies that surround the translation of this passage, however, do not call into question the fact that Timaeus 
here treats phenomena as fundamentally insubstantial, dependent on the form they imitate and on the receptacle in which they 
appear.  Due to this fundamental insubstantiality of phenomena, one cannot coherently speak in ways that treat phenomena as 
substantial.  Sallis writes that “[w]hichever interpretation is followed, the decisive point in the entire passage is clearly the flight 
of fire and the others from discourse” (Sallis 1999, 102-103). 
13 As would calling some single instantiation of fiery qualities ‘fire.’ 
14 Allen describes a reflection as a thing that “does not resemble the original; rather it is a resemblance of this original. . . .  
‘Resemblances of’ are quasi-substantial; relational entities, not relations.  They stand to their originals as the dependent to the 
independent, as the less real to the more real” (Allen 1960, 50-51).  Particulars, Allen claims, should be seen on the model of 
reflections, since their being is dependent and less real.  Lee also argues that the model of a reflection, an ‘insubstantial image’ 
best displays the character of phenomena as described in the Timaeus, since such phenomena lack any stable nature of their own, 
being rather a product of the interaction of the forms and the receptacle just as a reflection is the product of the interaction of an 
original and a mirror (Lee 1966, 352-360).  Thus, when Timaeus introduces the receptacle, “what Plato does there is to disclose 
the presence of the mirror” (Lee 1966, 357). 
15 Lee culls the same lesson from the gold example, writing that the “only genuine, autonomous reality to which we can 
physically point, the only one with an enduring and securely statable [sic] nature of its own, is the Receptacle:  the permanent 
medium, not the transient phenomenon” (Lee 1966, 359).  Although the language of ‘molding’ (metaplattôn), as well as that of 
‘impressing’ (apomattein) at 50e8-9, might suggest a malleable matter rather than a mirror, Lee points out that the language of 
‘impressions,’ at least, sometimes shows up in talk of mirrors, and so “does not disqualify our mirror analogy” (Lee 1966, 
357n.32). 
16 See Allen 1960, 49-52 and especially Lee 1966, 353-354 for a discussion of the difference between—in Lee’s terms—
substantial images, like statues, and insubstantial images, like reflections. 
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like reflections, they do not resemble the forms in which they participate, thus eliminating the need for an additional 
form, a ‘third man.’ 
One obvious problem, however, for proponents of the reflection view of particulars comes from the lack of 
direct textual evidence for their view:  Timaeus never compares the receptacle to a mirror;17 in fact, he compares 
particulars to a variety of images,18 and the comparison of the receptacle to gold suggests that the receptacle is more 
than just a mirror.  Thus, though the mirror analogy is not ‘disqualified,’19 it is not beyond criticism.   
More substantially, the mirror analogy fails to account for the ability of phenomena to move and suffer 
change independent of their models.20  Just as Timaeus introduces the receptacle, he discusses the changes that 
phenomena undergo.  The phenomenal elements change into one another, suffering dissolution (têkomenon), 
combustion (synkauthenta), and condensation (pyknoumenon) (49c).  The forms, however, do not change (see, e.g., 
28e-29a):  the motions of phenomena suggest that these things possess greater independence than mere reflections, 
which cannot move independently of each other if their models do not.21  Although the suggestion that sensible 
phenomena might survive the destruction or departure of the forms in which they participate confronts readers who 
refuse to see the receptacle as a mirror, the reflection model must be rejected, or only accepted with caution.22 
 
2.2  A horse does not resemble a painting of itself23 
 
In fact, the regress can be prevented without resorting to such “radical” claims as 1) that particulars are as 
insubstantial as reflections and 2) that by ‘image’ Plato really means only ‘reflection.’24  Because the image must 
not be of the same kind as the original, no relevant resemblance between image and original can exist:  a painted 
horse cannot resemble a horse with respect to being an actual horse.25  Image and original do not—must not26—
                                                
17Although Lee distinguishes himself from Allen on the basis of his reliance—in contrast to Allen—on “a specific and explicit 
platonic text” (Lee 1966, 365), nothing in the Timaeus is ‘specific and explicit’ enough to unequivocally confirm the aptness of 
the mirror analogy. 
18 Such as a ‘wetnurse’ of becoming (49a), a golden triangle (50a-b), a mother (50d), an embossed shape (50e-51a), space (52a-
b), and a winnowing sieve (52e-53a).  See Patterson, p. 46. 
19 Lee 1966, 357n.32. 
20 Patterson, 48. 
21 As Patterson points out, the “point is perhaps sharper in the case of self-initiated motions of living things” (Patterson, 48). 
22 Only accepted with caution since, as the attractiveness of the model cannot be denied—though Patterson is right that all 
images always ‘participate’ in their models, even ones that survive their models (Patterson, 46-47), the suggestion that 
phenomena might ‘survive’ their forms is unsavory.  Further, it’s not clear how treating the phenomenal world as like any image 
can explain the independent motion of phenomena, since most statues move even less than reflections. 
 When one attempts to replace the reflection model with other language, it grows difficult to avoid either the language 
of space or that of matter (see, for example, Kung 174-178, which includes a reading of Aristotle’s treatment of the receptacle).  
The receptacle, though, seems to possess characteristics that prevent one from reducing it simply to matter or space—in 
particular, the fact that is has a permanent sort of being (52a-b) and can be called ‘this’ (49e-50a) suggests something with more 
of a nature than simple matter or empty space.  Timaeus does call it ‘space’ (chôra), though he also compares it to the gold in a 
golden triangle:  neither matter nor space alone seem adequate, since the receptacle has features of both.  A mirror does handily 
perform tasks analogous to providing both space and matter for reflections, which occur on its surface and due to the relation of 
the mirror’s reflective qualities with objects and light; the mirror analogy, however—as discussed above—also seems 
insufficient.  Sallis attempts to characterize the receptacle in a way that avoids all of the language mentioned here, though it’s not 
an entirely straight-forward description: 
Because it nurtures and shelters the image, the chôra is anything but a mere mirror in which perpetual being would be 
reflected and the cosmos thus fabricated in the same way that all things could be made by the clever and wonderful 
man who took a mirror and carried it around everywhere (Rep. 596c-d).  One could call it, rather, a ghost scene that, 
enshrouding precisely in letting appear, endows the fleeting specters with whatever trace of being they might enjoy 
(Sallis 1999, 122). 
23 This section offers an adaptation of Patterson’s view—he himself rejects a view of forms as patterns (Patterson, 16-19). 
24 Lee’s view is called ‘radical’ at Patterson 175ff.  The argument that Patterson’s model of imaging resists the regress comes at 
Patterson, 51-62:  my account here will, I hope, represent the whole of Patterson’s arguments.  For discussion of and objections 
to the mirror analogy, see above, section 3.1. 
25 Patterson, 59-60. 
26 See Cratylus 432a-b. 
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resemble each other in the way in which the particular resembles another particular, and, therefore, the form cannot 
be grouped together with the particulars in that respect.  Without such a resemblance, the regress cannot occur. 
The relation of ‘being an image of’ justifies the naming of the image after its model in a way that refers not 
to a resemblance, but to a causal relation.   
The positive link that removes image and model F from the realm of bare homonyms is the image’s being 
an image of its model. . . .  We label the drawing ‘horse’ rather than ‘cabbage’ because it is a drawing of a 
horse.27 
 
This relation between image and original justifies the naming of the image after the original, since it defines the 
image precisely as of the original.   
Note that all images,—painting and sculptures as well as reflections—on this reading, are adjectival in the 
same way that Allen’s reflected scarf is adjectival—the painting of Simmias is properly called, as in the Phaedo, 
‘Simmias depicted’ (Simmias gegrammenos) (73e6-7).  The painting of Simmias is essentially adjectival as a 
painting of Simmias—it is no more a thing in its own right than the reflected scarf.  The painting, inasmuch as it is a 
painting of Simmias, exists only in its reference to Simmias.  In its own right, the painting does exist as pigment on 
canvas; but it is no image at all without reference to Simmias, upon whom it depends.  Thus, the ‘third man’ should 
be prevented just as easily on this model as on the reflection model, since the images, as images, cannot be said to 
have properties in the same way as their models. 
Sensible resemblance plays no part in this account.28  A perfect reproduction of Cratylus, for example, is 
not an image of him, but rather another Cratylus: 
Suppose some god didn’t just represent your color and shape the way painters do, but made all the inner parts like 
yours . . . in a word, suppose he made a duplicate of everything you have and put it beside you.  Would 
there then be two Cratyluses or Cratylus and an image of Cratylus? (Cratylus, 432b2-c5).29   
 
Patterson points out that images not only cannot perfectly capture their models—in fact, an image of a given object 
must not resemble the model insofar as the model is a particular sort of object.30  No image of a horse can actually 
be a horse—if it were, it is no longer an image, but another horse.31  Drawings of horses, therefore, are not called 
‘horse’ because they resemble horses—if they did actually resemble horses with respect to being horses, they would 
be horses, not drawings.  
The only apparent similarity between the painted horse and the actual horse is their sharing the designation 
‘horse.’  On the model found in the Timaeus, particulars’ only apparent similarity to forms is likewise their sharing a 
designation, like ‘fire.’  The particular bit of flame cannot truly resemble the fire itself:  it cannot be, among other 
things, eternal and unchanging; and the fire itself, being non-physical, cannot possess properties essential to 
phenomenal fire like temperature or color.   
One might wonder, though, whether—in the absence of a common characteristic—the two deserve to share 
a name.  The form can be seen as an ‘abstract nature or essence’:32  forms might be understood as abstract models 
                                                
27 Patterson, 42—italics original.  
28 Patterson says that “it is very doubtful that Plato believed imaging as such requires resemblance” (Patterson, 61). 
29 I shall make use of Reeve’s translation of the Cratylus, noting any changes 
30 Patterson offers a more formalized version of his position:  “it is essential to something’s being an image F or an imitation of 
F that it not be a real F, that it not share the property of being F with the model or real thing itself” (Patterson, 21).  Barney 
argues that Socrates’ argument does not show that “correctness cannot simply track resemblance” (Barney, 121).  For Barney, the 
argument does not do away with the notion of correctness in images, but rather simply calls a standard of ‘mimetic correctness’ 
into question.  Barney objects to the claim (which she credits to Patterson) that Socrates here shows a distinction between images 
and copies or duplicates (Barney, 121n.13).  Barney goes on to suggest that it does not follow “from the fact that what is perfectly 
f cannot be a g that f-ness is not the appropriate norm by which to judge g’s” (Barney, 121.n14).  She offers the example of a 
‘perfectly quick’ runner, who covers a distance in 0 seconds, and who “cannot be sprinting; but a sprinter sprints well by 
sprinting quickly” (Barney, 121n.14).  I am, however, not at all convinced that moving in no time is a case of perfect quickness, 
rather than a simple defiance of physical laws. 
31 “[T]he reflection of Cratylus in the mirror or on water is not another Cratylus; the black-figure warrior on a vase is not 
another, only qualified or imperfect, warrior; the marble Hermes is not itself a god” (Patterson, 20). 
32 Patterson, 67-68, 73. 
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that dictate what it is to be a given thing.33  In the discussion of the correctness of names in the Cratylus, the 
characters agree that “even if a name doesn’t include all the appropriate letters, it will still describe the thing (lexetai 
ge to pragma) if it includes its pattern (typos)” (Cratylus, 433a4-6).  This statement about names—which the 
characters in the Cratylus treat as like images (e.g., 432b-d)—shows that an image and its original ought to share a 
name whenever the image captures the pattern of the original.  This statement suggests a reason for a form and a 
particular sharing a name:  if the particular appears to fit the ‘pattern’ dictated by the form, it deserves to be called 
after that form.34  The form of fire dictates, in some manner, the characteristics necessarily present in any fiery 
thing.  Although the form of fire does not possess these characteristics, its nature, if understood, enables one to see 
the necessity of these characteristics.  The ‘pattern’ is attributed to the form inasmuch as the form dictates that 
pattern; and it is attributed to any particular thing that fits the pattern.  A thing’s embodying the characteristics 
dictated by some form justifies calling the thing after the form, just as a thing’s being an image of an object justified 
calling the image after the object.35  As an image is a depiction of a model, a particular is an instantiation or 
embodiment of a pattern.  
On this interpretation of the image model, the ‘third man’ regress cannot occur—the image and the model 
must not resemble each other in any relevant way, though the image is a resemblance of the model.  Likewise, a 
particular cannot resemble the form in which it participates, despite the fact that the particular instantiates the pattern 
which the form dictates.  If actual resemblance between form and particular is impossible, the ‘third man’ regress 
must also be impossible. 
At least one question remains:  how does this model answer the question of the motion of particulars?  
Statues and paintings cannot move independently any more than reflections can—this objection against the mirror 
analogy resurfaces on this broader conception of image.  Perhaps one might defend this model with the claim that 
the activity of sensible things is a part of their instantiation of the pattern.36  Instantiating or embodying a form such 
as animal itself in the unstable, temporal universe might require motion of the particulars.  Indeed, Timaeus says that 
the heavens exist as a moving image of eternity precisely because “it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon 
anything that is begotten” (37d).  Since particular things must exist in time, their motion might help them instantiate 
the eternal pattern dictated by forms. 
Thus, one might view particulars and forms as like images and models in the sense that a causal connection 
exists between the two despite the fact that the forms and models cannot resemble the particulars and images.  The 
interpretation offered here possesses many virtues.  First, this account accords well with the descriptions of the 
relation of form and particular in the dialogues.  Second, the account highlights the dependent, adjectival nature of 
particulars.  Perhaps most importantly, this account allows Plato to avoid the third man regress, which cannot occur 
if the forms do not resemble the particulars.  Finally, the account favored here—in contrast to the reflection model, 
which also brings those first three advantages—does not restrict Plato’s conception of images to reflections alone.  
No platonic text makes such a restriction, and an exclusive focus on reflections as the proper analogue for particulars 
renders the motion of particular things incomprehensible.  Thus, the image analogy successfully conveys the nature 
of particulars’ relation to forms, and successfully avoids the third man regress. 
                                                
33 Dorter writes that forms are in a sense “possibilities of reality, possibilities of the kinds of things and qualities that can exist in 
accordance with the nature of reality” (Dorter 1994, 21—original italics).  The forms offer indications of the sort of thing or 
quality that might occur at any given moment, and justify one’s calling the appearance after the possibility. 
34 This mention of Cratylus 433a has benefited from a reading of Lee’s dissertation (Lee 1964, 15-16); though I cannot agree 
with Lee that typos here refers to an ‘essential feature’ shared by form and particular (Lee 1964, 16), I do agree that some notion 
of typos explains the similarity of particular and form.  I also agree with Lee that the LSJ translation of typos at Cratylus 432e-
433a as ‘general impression, vague indication’ or ‘approximate indication’ misses the mark, though I accept Reeve’s translation, 
‘pattern,’ which I believe Lee would not.  Sedley offers ‘outline’ as his preferred translation (Sedley 2003, 138).  The term itself 
should be general enough to fit with a sense such as ‘pattern’; Sedley’s own explanation, however, agrees with Lee that the 
relation involves something like  resemblance, and so I must reject Sedley’s view.  For more on typos, see the extensive entry in 
LSJ. 
35 Patterson, 73. 
36 A suggestion from Thomas M. Tuozzo. 
Dominick Philol 2006 p. 7 
 
Works	  Cited	  
 
Plato: 
Cratylus.  In Platonis Opera, Vol. 1.  Ed. E. A. Duke et al.  Oxford and New York:  Oxford  
 University Press, 1995.  188-275. 
—.  Translated by C. D. C. Reeve.  In Plato:  Complete Works.  Edited, with introduction  
 and notes by John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis and Cambridge:  Hackett Publishing  
 Company, 1997.  101-156. 
Parmenides.  In Platonis Opera, Vol. 2.  Ed. John Burnet.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  
 1901. 
—.  Translated by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan.  In Plato:  Complete Works.  Edited, with  
 introduction and notes by John M. Cooper, 1997.  Indianapolis and Cambridge:   
 Hackett Publishing Company.  359-397. 
Phaedo.  In Duke, E. A. et al., ed.  Platonis Phaedo.  In Platonis Opera, Vol. 1.  Oxford and New  
 York:  Oxford University Press, 1995.  88-186. 
—.  Translated by David Gallop.  In Plato Phaedo.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1975. 
Timaeus.  In Platonis Opera, Vol. 4.  Ed. Burnet.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1902. 
—.  Translated, with introduction by Donald J. Zeyl.  Indianapolis and Cambridge:   
 Hackett Publishing Company, 2000. 
 
Secondary Literature: 
Allen, R. E.  “Participation and Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues.”  Philosophical  
Review, 1960.  Reprinted in Allen 1965.  43-60. 
—, Ed.  Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics.  London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1965. 
Cherniss, H. F.  “A Much Misread Passage of the Timaeus (49c7-50b5).”  In The American  
 Journal of Philology.  Vol. 75. No. 2.  (1954).  113-130. 
Cornford, Francis M.  Plato’s Cosmology.  Routledge, 1937.  Reprinted 1997 at Indianapolis and  
 Cambridge:  Hackett Publishing Company. 
Dorter, Kenneth.  Form and Good in Plato’s Eleatic Dialogues:  The Parmenides, Thaeatetus,  
 Sophist, and Statesman.  Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:  University of California  
 Press, 1994. 
Geach, P. T.  “The Third Man Again.”  In The Philosophical Review, 1956.  Reprinted in  
 Allen 1965.  265-278. 
Gill, Mary Louise.  “Matter and Flux in Plato’s Timaeus.”  In Phronesis 32 (1987), 34-53. 
Hunt, David.  “How (not) to exempt Plato’s Forms from Parmenides’ Third Man.”  In  
 Phronesis 42 (1997), 1-20. 
Kung, Joan.  “Why the Receptacle is not a Mirror.”  In Archiv Fur Geschichte der  
 Philosophie.  1987.  167-178. 
Lee, Edward N.  “On Plato’s Timaeus 49d4-e7.”  In The American Journal of Philology.  Vol.  
 88, No. 1 (Jan., 1967).  1-28. 
—.  “On the Metaphysics of the Image in Plato’s Timaeus.”  In Monist 50, 1966.   
 341-368. 
—.  “The Concept of the ‘Image’ in Plato’s Metaphysics.” Diss.  Princeton University, 1964. 
—.  “The Second ‘Third Man’; an Interpretation.”  In Patterns in Plato’s Thought.  Edited by  
 J. M. E. Moravcsik.  Dordrecht-Holland:  D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973.   
 101-122. 
Patterson, Richard.  Image and Reality in Plato’s Metaphysics.  Indianapolis:  Hackett  
 Publishing Company, 1985 
Sallis, John.  Being and Logos:  Reading the Platonic Dialogues.  Third Edition.   
 Bloomington and Indianapolis:  Indiana University Press, 1996.  First Edition 1975. 
—.  Chorology:  On Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus.  Bloomington and Indianapolis:  Indiana  
 University Press, 1999. 
Schofield, Malcolm.  “Likeness and Likenesses in the Parmenides.”  In Form and Argument  
 in Late Plato.  Ed. Christopher Gill and Mary Margaret McCabe.  Oxford:  Oxford  
 University Press, 1996.  49-78. 
Sedley, David.  Plato’s Cratylus.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Silverman, Allan.  The Dialectic of Essence:  A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics.  Princeton and  
 Oxford:  Princeton University Press, 2002. 
Vlastos, Gregory.  “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides.”  In The Philosophical Review,  
 1954.  Reprinted in Allen 1965.  231-264. 
White, Nicholas P.  A Companion to Plato’s Republic.  Indianapolis and Cambridge:  Hackett  
Publishing Company, 1979. 
Dominick Philol 2006 p. 8 
 
Dominick Philol 2006 p. 9 
 
 
